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Filtering Approaches for Dealing with Noise in Anomaly Detection
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Abstract—The leading workhorse of anomaly (and attack)
detection in the literature has been residual-based detectors,
where the residual is the discrepancy between the observed out-
put provided by the sensors (inclusive of any tampering along
the way) and the estimated output provided by an observer.
These techniques calculate some statistic of the residual and
apply a threshold to determine whether or not to raise an alarm.
To date, these methods have not leveraged the frequency content
of the residual signal in making the detection problem easier,
specifically dealing with the case of (e.g., measurement) noise.
Here we demonstrate some opportunities to combine filtering to
enhance the performance of residual-based detectors. We also
demonstrate how filtering can provide a compelling alternative
to residual-based methods when paired with a robust observer.
In this process, we consider the class of attacks that are stealthy,
or undetectable, by such filtered detection methods and the
impact they can have on the system.
I. INTRODUCTION
In anomaly detection, we seek to differentiate normal
behavior from anomalous behavior - essentially anything
that deviates away from the nominal model. This task is
easy if our confidence is high in the nominal model but
as uncertainty rises, distinguishing normal from anomalous
becomes more challenging. From a control theory perspec-
tive, one of the most fundamental sources of uncertainty is
measurement noise and in this work we present an intuitive,
but to-date-unexplored, idea of combining traditional model-
based detection schemes with low-pass filtering to reduce
the impact of noise on our ability to detect anomalies in
control systems. Beyond demonstrating that this approach
enables better detection, the novelty lies in characterizing
this performance boost analytically, in characterizing how
this effects the impact an attacker can have on the system,
and in understanding what new kind of attacks are possible
when filtering is involved.
There is a deep literature from Fault Detection that lever-
ages model-based detectors to identify the occurrence of
faults [1]. More recently these tools have been reused in
identifying the presence of attacks in control systems [2]-
[11]. Attacks, in particular their strategic and exploitative
nature, offer new challenges to both control theory and
anomaly detection. While many research groups have rallied
behind the banner of analyzing attacks in control systems and
*This work is supported by the ConTex grant award 2018-56A and 2018-
56B .
1These authors are with the Departments of Mechanical and Systems
Engineering at the University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas, USA
navid.hashemi@, jruths@utdallas.edu
2These authors are with the Department of Electronics and Telecom-
munications at the Scientific Research and Advanced Studies Cen-
ter of Ensenada, Mexico (CICESE) jverdugo@cicese.edu.mx,
jpena@cicese.mx
the challenges they raise, in what follows we describe the
main representative contributions of these groups that relate
to characterizing the tuning and performance of model-based
detectors.
While all papers [2]-[11] investigate the use of model-
based detectors, and [2]-[10] consider various types of at-
tacks, it has only been recently that the impact of these
attacks has been evaluated [6]-[10]. Of these [4], [8], [10] use
the reachable set to characterize attack impact and [6], [7],
[9] use various norms of system state or the estimation error
covariance [5]. To a large extent this work on attacker impact
has been facilitated by analytic methods to tune model-based
detectors, as provided in [4], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11] and for
work to define various types of worst-case attacks [3], [5]-
[10]. In all of these cases Gaussian noise(s) are assumed on
the measurements of the system (and possibly the system
state), except in [11] which tunes a detector for generalized
noise distributions.
While much has been done with model-based detectors,
no study has integrated a low-pass filter to attenuate the
effect of the noise on the attacker’s capabilities to change the
system state. The recent work to to tune classical detectors to
desired levels of performance (desired false alarm rate) and to
characterize the attacker’s impact on the system state (given
the attacker’s desire to remain stealthy to classical detectors)
positions us well to now add another layer, i.e., filtering,
to the detection scheme. In Section III, we characterize
the improvement gained by adding the filter (in terms of
sensitivity to attacks and reduction in attacker capabilities)
traded off with the new attack definitions that are stealthy to
the introduced low-pass chi-squared detector.
This notion of filtering is not exclusive to retrofit con-
ventional residual-based detectors, but generalizes in com-
pelling ways to other types of model-based observers. In
particular, in Section IV, we review how the discontinuous
observer, an estimator that uses a sliding mode to yield
finite-time convergence, produces a discontinuous term that
can be filtered to produce an estimate of the disturbance
that enters a system [12]. In this case, we reframe the
disturbance estimation problem as a method to approximate
the anomaly (e.g., failure and/or attack), which provides an
attractive alternative to residual-based detectors. In this case
the disturbance estimate not only provides a way to detect the
presence of an anomaly, but also find the form of the anomaly
so that advanced mitigation strategies can be employed -
such as using the estimated anomaly as feedback to avoid
the estimate to deviate away from the true state value.
In Section II we introduce the system and our notation
as well as the attack context; in Section V we provide an
example that combines and compares both of these tools.
II. SYSTEM & CONTEXT
We consider a continuous, linear, time-invariant control
system {
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t),
y(t) = Cx(t) + η(t),
(1)
in which x(t) ∈ Rn is the system state, u(t) ∈ Rm is the
input, A∈ Rn×n is the system matrix,B ∈ Rn×m is the input
matrix, y ∈ Rp is the system output, and η(t) ∈ Rp is zero
mean Gaussian additive measurement noise with covariance
R, i.e., η(t) ∼ N (0, R). The pair (A,C) is detectable and
the pair (A,B) is stablizable.
We use the output y and an estimator to produce an
estimate of the state, xˆ(t). In this work we consider two
different choices of estimators. We use this estimate for to
construct the feedback law,
u(t) = Kxˆ(t). (2)
The process measurements are potentially corrupted by an
attacker, who is able to read and arbitrarily change the sensor
measurements. We model this as an additive attack δ(t) ∈ Rp
such that y(t) is changed to y¯(t),
y¯(t) = y(t) + δ(t) = Cx(t) + η(t) + δ(t). (3)
A. Attacker Capabilities
In this work we assume that the attacker has access
to all system information including, e.g., dynamics, states,
estimator states, and detector parameters. In particular, the
attacker can view (disclosure) and edit (disruption) sensor
measurements.
III. RESIDUAL-BASED ANOMALY DETECTION
The residual quantifies the difference between what we
receive from the sensor, y¯(t) and what we expect based on
an estimator, yˆ(t) = Cxˆ(t),
r(t) = y¯(t)− Cxˆ(t), (4)
Anomaly detectors use this quantity to make real-time
choices in the state of the control system they monitor.
To build an estimate of the system state we use a Luen-
berger observer with observer gain L ∈ Rn×p,
˙ˆx(t) =Axˆ(t) +Bu(t) + L(y¯(t)− Cxˆ(t)). (5)
Armed with this estimator, we can express the difference
between the state and expected state as the estimation error
e(t) = x(t) − xˆ(t), which leads to the following coupled
closed-loop equations,
x˙(t) =
(
A+BK
)
x(t)−BKe(t),
e˙(t) =
(
A− LC)e(t)− Lη(t)− Lδ(t),
r(t) = Ce(t) + η(t) + δ(t).
(6)
The steady state Kalman filter is the standard choice of
estimator used when employing residual based detectors.
This allows us to calculate the steady state covariance of
the estimation error from the stochastic dynamics of e(t)
using the following Riccati equation,
P˙ = 0 = (A− LC)P + P (A− LC)′ + LRL′. (7)
Because the detection process is inherently a sampled
approach we discretize (6) with uniform step size τ such
that ξ(kτ) = ξk,
xk+1 = Fxk +Gek,
ek+1 = Hek − Ld(ηk + δk),
rk = Cek + ηk + δk.
(8)
Residual-based detection relies on quantifying the distribu-
tion of the residual under nominal operation, i.e., without at-
tacks/anomalies. These statistics form a one-sided hypothesis
test that is either accepted (no anomalies) or rejected (alarm
raised). The discrete covariance of ηk is Ση = τR and the
discrete covariance of the estimation error is Σe = τP . In
the absence of attack the distribution of the residual follows
a zero-mean Gaussian distribution with the covariance [13],
Σr = E[rkr
′
k] = CΣeC
′ +Ση. (9)
In the following subsections we will review the conventional
chi-squared detector and subsequently extend this detector to
enhance its performance.
A. Chi-Squared Detector
The role of the detector is to create a non-negative scalar-
valued random variable from the residual that can be easily
compared with a threshold. One of the most widely used
approaches to do this is given by the chi-squared detector
which introduces a distance measure
z(t) = r′(t)Σ−1r r(t). (10)
Since the residual is normally distributed, the distance mea-
sure, as a sum of squared Gaussian random variables, is
chi-squared distributed (with p degrees of freedom, where
p is the number of the sensors). By normalizing the residual
covariance, we eliminate system dependence. The detection
procedure for the chi-squared detector is summarized as
follows. For given a threshold α ∈ R>0 and the distance
measure in (10){
z(t) ≤ α −→ no alarm,
z(t) > α −→ alarm. (11)
Since the chi-squared distribution has p degrees of freedom
the distance measure has mean E[z(t)] = p and covariance
E[z2] = 2p during nominal (no anomaly) operation. In the
presence of attacks/anomalies the distance measure will, in
general, not fall according to a chi-squared distribution with
mean value p and covariance 2p. As indicated in (11), the
detector is required to make a decision to raise or not raise
an alarm at every time instant. Therefore, it is impractical to
build a sample distribution of “current behavior” to decide
if the distance measure was still distributed in chi-squared
fashion - this would take too long. Instead, the alarms, and
more specifically, the rate of alarms can be used as a metric
for how deviated the system is from nominal behavior.
Here alarm rate is defined as the rate of generation of
alarms by the detector, which empirically is the fraction of
time instants in which an alarm was raised. We expect alarms
to be raised regularly, even under normal operation, because
of the infinite support of the measurement noise. We can
predict the false alarm rate A - the alarm rate under normal
operation - from the distance measure distribution, Pr(z >
α) = A. More importantly, we can set the false alarm rate to
a desired valueA∗ by selecting the threshold α appropriately.
Lemma 1: [13]. Consider a stochastic LTI system under
normal operation and a chi-squared detector, with threshold
α ∈ R>0, rk ∼ N (0,Σ). Let α = α∗ := 2P−1(1 −
A∗, p2 ), where P−1(·, ·) denotes the inverse regularized lower
incomplete gamma function, then A = A∗.
If the attacker wants to remain stealthy (undetected) to the
detector, the threshold of the chi-squared detector puts a limit
on the distance measure. It, therefore, limits the capabili-
ties of stealthy attacks to change the system behavior. We
derive worst-case stealthy attacks by assuming a powerful,
knowledgeable attacker that knows the noisy measurement
Cx + η and also knows the state estimate xˆ, the attack can
compensate for the terms in the residual
δk = −y¯k + Cxˆk +Σ
1
2
r δ¯k, (12)
such that
zk = δ¯
′
k δ¯k. (13)
By increasing the norm of δ¯k the attacker can increase the
impact of the attack up to the point where the attack is
identified by the detector; the “direction” of the vector δ¯k
indicates the extent to which the attack impacts each sensor.
In zero alarm attacks the attacker takes the perspective
that raising no alarms is the way to avoid detection, essen-
tially keeping the distance measure below the threshold,
zk = δ¯
′
kδ¯k ≤ α, (14)
and hence ‖δ¯k‖ ≤ √α.
In hidden attacks, the attacker realizes that under normal
operation alarms are generated at the rate of A∗, hence, it
is reasonable to generate an attack sequence that mimics the
false alarm rate,
Pr(zk > α) = Pr
(‖δ¯k‖ > √α) = A∗. (15)
Hidden attacks are inherently more potent than zero-alarm
attacks, especially when keeping in mind that the norm of the
attack can be arbitrarily large at the time instants in which
alarms are raised.
For more detail on these attacks and ways in which to
evaluate the impact of these attacks through state deviation
or the induced reachable set see [9], [10].
B. Filtered Chi-Squared Detector
In this section we introduce a modification to the chi-
squared detector to leverage apriori knowledge that the noise
is typically composed of substantially higher frequencies
than the disturbances or many types of anomalies. By fil-
tering the residual signal, we aim to reduce the covariance
of the statistic that forms the distance measure so that attacks
are more readily apparent. Exploiting frequency domain
information has not been combined with attack detection
and here we introduce the approach and characterize its
performance.
We filter the residual element-wise using a bank of p
identical Butterworth filters (of second order) such that
ξi(t) = [ξ1i(t), ξ2i(t)]
′ and{
ξ˙i(t) = Φξi(t) + Ψri(t),
ρi(t) = [1 0]ξi(t)
(16)
for i = 1, . . . , p and where
Φ =
[
0 1
−ω2c −
√
2ωc
]
, Ψ =
[
0
ω2c
]
. (17)
and we use the filtered output ρ(t) to construct a new distance
measure. To characterize the distribution of this distance
measure, first characterize the covariance of ρi(t).
Theorem 1: Given a residual signal rk ∼ N (0,Σr) fil-
tered through the Butterworth filter in (16)-(17) with band-
width ωc, the discrete-time filter with sampling rate τ output
ρk is zero mean Gaussian with covariance,
Σρ =
τωc
2
√
2
Σr. (18)
Proof: We first discretize the filter with time step τ{
ξ
(i)
k = Φdξ
(i)
k +Ψdr
(i)
k ,
ρ
(i)
k = [1 0]ξ
(i)
k
(19)
where ζ
(i)
k = ζi(kτ) and for small enough τ , Φd = I +Φτ
and Ψd = Ψτ . To find the covariance of the filtered residual
vector ρk we collect all filters together,
ξ˙k = Φ˜ξk + Ψ˜rk, (20)
with Φ˜ = Φd⊗Ip and Ψ˜ = Ψd⊗Ip and where ξk ∈ R2p, Φ˜ ∈
R
2p×2p and Ψ˜ ∈ R2p×p. We can define the covariance of ξk
as P = [Pi,j ], i = 1, . . . , p and j = 1, . . . , p, where Pi,j ∈
R
2×2. This total covariance is supplied by the discrete-time
Riccati equation (in steady state),
0 = Φ˜PΦ˜′ − P + Ψ˜ΣrΨ˜′, (21)
and following some algebra manipulation reveals that we can
split this into Riccati equations on each subblock
ΦdPi,jΦ′d − Pi,j +Ψd[Σr]i,jΨ′d = 0. (22)
From (22) we see that Pi,j = Pj,i because [Σr]i,j = [Σr]j,i
and in addition based on (21), we know that Pi,j = P ′j,i,
therefore matrix Pi,j is a symmetric square matrix. The
covariance of ρ(t) can be computed element-wise using the
structure of Φd and Ψd leaving,
[Σρ]i,j = [Pi,j ]11 (23)
= −τωc (τωc)
2 −√2τωc + 2
(τωc)3 − 3
√
2(τωc)2 + 8τωc − 4
√
2
Σr
If the sampling time is taken small enough the higher order
terms vanish leaving
[Σρ]i,j =
τωc
2
√
2
[Σr]i,j , (24)
which leads directly to (18).
Remark 1: Note that τ is the sampling time of the system,
which highlights that the filtered covariance is expected to
be significantly smaller than the covariance of the original
residual. By reducing the covariance of the nominal behavior
using this filtering technique the aim is to make it easier to
distinguish attacks and anomalies (especially those with low
frequency components).
Using this covariance, we can create a new normalized
distance measure
zk = ρ
′
kΣ
−1
ρ ρk =
2
√
2
τωc
ρ′kΣ
−1
r ρk. (25)
Because ρk is a Gaussian random variable, z(t) is also chi-
squared. In fact, because of the normalization by the covari-
ance, this functions exactly like the conventional chi-squared
detector (including using Lemma 1 to select the threshold).
The major difference lies in the scale of the normalizing
covariance; here being smaller provides an advantage to
identify smaller attacks. To execute these attacks, attackers
will also need to know the cut-off frequency of the filter.
Analogous to (12), we define
δk = −yk + Cxˆk +
(
τωc
2
√
2
Σr
) 1
2
δ¯k, (26)
where δ¯k is an independent random variable that attackers
may select to define different classes of stealthy attacks.
As before the zero alarm attack is generated in a way
so that no alarm is generated by the detector. The precise
characterization of the sequence δ¯k is a topic for future
work, however, intuitively the fact that the attack signal
is also filtered by the low-pass filter, it follows that the
frequency content (as quantified by a Fourier Transform)
and not just the amplitude (norm) of the attack vector plays
a role in quantifying zero alarm attacks. To start, note that
zero alarm attacks of the conventional chi-squared detector
will also be zero alarm attacks of the filtered chi-squared
detector. On top of this, there is an opportunity to inject
high frequency content into the attack, which would be
attenuated by the action of filter. If the filtered chi-squared
used an ideal low pass filter, it would be possible to inject
any signal that had frequency content higher than the cut-
off frequency of the filter. The second order filter requires
some adjustment to balance the small contributions from the
stopband frequencies with that of the passband frequencies.
Similar to the unfiltered case, we employ the zero alarm
attack constraint in a probabilistic fashion for the correspond-
ing hidden attack. In this case δ¯k is selected such that the
Fourier frequency content is now bounded in probability.
Again the full characterization of these attacks are for future
work.
IV. DISCONTINUOUS OBSERVER
In this section, we present an anomaly detector for smooth
attacks δ(t), based on a robust observer and a low pass filter,
which is applicable for a particular class of second order
systems, i.e., systems of the form (1) with x = [x1 x2]
T ,
A ∈ R2×2, B ∈ R2, and C ∈ R1×2. Note, however, that
any physical plant that can be partitioned into a collection
of second order systems can be captured by an extended
version of the presented methods.
The observer is given by [12]
˙ˆx = Axˆ+Bu+ Γe+Bc3sign(y¯ − yˆ), (27)
yˆ = Cxˆ, (28)
where xˆ = [xˆ1 xˆ2]
T , e = [(y¯ − yˆ) (x2 − xˆ2)]T , xˆi ∈ R,
and the diagonal matrix Γ = diag(c1, c2), with c1, c2 > 0.
Finally, the gain c3 of the discontinuous term can be chosen
as described in [12].
An interesting feature of this observer is that, by filtering
the discontinuous term, it is possible to identify distur-
bances/anomalies. This is shown as follows. First, assume
that the measurement is free of noise, i.e., η(t) = 0 in (3),
and define the observation errors
e1 = y¯ − yˆ, and e2 = x2 − xˆ2. (29)
Then, by considering the output vector C = [1 0], the
corresponding observation error dynamics is described by
e˙1 = e2 − c1e1 + δ˙, (30)
e˙2 = −(a+ c2)e1 − be2 − c3sign(e1) + aδ. (31)
When the system reaches the discontinuous surface, it fol-
lows that e1 = e˙1 = 0. Substituting this into (30) it follows
that on the discontinuous surface, the observation error e2
satisfies
e2 = −δ˙, (32)
and consequently, it also holds that
e˙2 = −δ¨. (33)
Next, by using the equivalent control method [14], it
follows from (31)-(33) that, on the discontinuous surface, the
filtered version of the discontinuous term c3sign(e1) satisfies
c3sign(e1) = δ¨ + aδ + bδ˙, (34)
where the over bar denotes filtering.
In order to obtain c3sign(e1), we use the low-pass Butter-
worth filter, written in state-space form
x˙f = Afxf +Bfc3sign(e1), (35)
yf = Cfxf , (36)
where xf = [xf1 xf2]
T and
Af =
[
0 1
−ω2c −1.4142ωc
]
, Bf =
[
0
ω2c
]
, (37)
Cf =
[
1 0
]
, (38)
where ωc is the cut-off frequency of the filter. Then, by
choosing a ωc that minimizes the phase delay, it is possible
to assume that
yf ≈ δ¨ + aδ + bδ˙. (39)
A. Anomaly output detector with robust observer and filter
In order to design the anomaly output detector, it is worth
nothing that the output yf of the filter, see (39), can indeed
be seen as a residual because it contains information about
the attack/anomaly in the output of the plant.
Then, similar to (11), we define the following detector{
|yf (t)| ≤ αf −→ no alarm −→ alarm = 0,
|yf (t)| > αf −→ alarm −→ alarm = 1.
(40)
For the time being, we do not have a formal procedure for
determining the upper threshold αf . Instead, the value of αf
is numerically determined by directly measuring the output
of the filter, for sufficiently long time, and then the value
of αf will correspond to the L∞-norm computed from the
obtained measurement.
Remark 2: Note that for the free-noise case, i.e., η = 0,
and considering that the attack is constant, i.e., δ := δ0, with
δ0 ∈ R, then the output of the filter, see (39), satisfies
yf ≈ aδ0. (41)
Hence, in this case, it is possible to reconstruct the attack.
Note that this fact opens the possibility of using the estimated
attack in the control in order to make the system/plant
immune to constant attacks by preventing the drift of the
estimation error. However, it should be noted that in order
to estimate the attack δ0, it is necessary to have knowledge
of parameter a, which is a parameter of the plant.
V. EXAMPLE
This section presents a numerical example, which illus-
trates the performance of the detectors presented in Sections
III and IV. In particular, we consider a second order system
of the form (1) with
A =
[
0 1
−4 −20
]
, B =
[
0
1
]
, C =
[
1 0
]
. (42)
Furthermore it is assumed that the output is influenced by
zero-mean Gaussian noise η(t) ∼ N (0, R).
A. Residual-Based Methods
We now demonstrate these tools and provide a comparison
between the filtered and unfiltered version of the chi-squared
detector. The system matrices are provided above; here
we use a control gain K = [1, 1] and an observer gain
L = [0, 2]′. The sampling time is T = 0.001 and the
corresponding measurement noise covariance is Ση = 2.
The idea behind this comparison is that filtration makes the
covariance of the filtered residual smaller and removes the
high frequency content of the measurement noise, therefore,
the attack will be more identifiable when filter is applied.
This ease of detecting the attack is apparent when the
alarm rate corresponding to the filtered detector deviates
more significantly from the desired/tuned false alarm rate,
indicating the detector’s sensitivity to the attack is higher.
We consider a simple attack to demonstrate this point,
δ(t) = 1. (43)
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Fig. 1. This figure shows the performance of the proposed filter-based
detector. Using a threshold of α = 3.84 both detectors have been tuned
to provide a A∗ = 0.05 (5%) false alarm rate. The green curve plots the
cumulative distribution function of the distance measure under attack when
computed from the filtered residual ρk and exhibits a dramatic difference
from what the distribution looks like under normal operation (red). This
is quantified by a higher than expected false alarm rate A = 0.55 (55%).
In contrast, the blue curve plots the cumulative distribution function of the
distance measure under attack when computed from the residual without
filtering. Not only does the distribution stay quite similar under attack, but
the alarm rate is 7% which is only 2% bigger than the false alarm rate.
Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution of distance
measure calculated from rk under attack (blue) compared
with the cumulative distribution of the distance measure
under no attacks (red). Because the distributions are closely
similar, the conventional chi-squared detector is not able to
easily distinguish the attack. This figure also compares the
cumulative distribution of the distance measure calculated
from the filtered residual ρk (green). In this case the small
attack significantly changes the distribution of the distance
measure and detection is easy. This is captured quantitatively
by comparing the false alarm rates. Here the detectors were
tuned to provide A∗ = 0.05 (5%) false alarms (i.e., under
no attacks) by selecting the threshold as α = 3.84.
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Fig. 2. The probability density functions, since they are not normalized,
aptly demonstrate the role of shrinking covariance in the detection problem.
The difference between the attacked and nominal behavior is more dramatic
in the filtered residual ρk (lower panel) than in the residual rk (upper panel).
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Fig. 3. Residual signal for the noise free case. a) Residual for the time
varying attack (44). Black line: measured residual. Gray line: predicted
residual from (39). b) Residual for the constant attack (45). Black line:
measured residual. Gray line: predicted residual from Eq. (41).
Under attack the conventional detector’s alarm rate was
7% whereas the filtered detector’s alarm rate was 55%,
demonstrating the dramatic difference in sensitivity provided
by the additional filtration.
Because the residual and filtered residual are not them-
selves normalized (as opposed to the distance measure which
is normalized), the role that covariance plays is quite clear
in Fig. 2. Here the reduced covariance of the filtered residual
clearly distinguishes the attack scenario from the normal
operation. This distinction is less obvious in the unfiltered
residual.
B. Discontinuous Observer
For the case of the observer-based detector discussed in
Section IV, we consider observer (27)-(28) with A, B, and
C as given in (42) and the gains c1 = c2 = 5, and c3 = 12.
For this choice of ci, i = 1, . . . , 3, the observation error is
globally asymptotically stable for the noise free (η = 0) and
attack free (δ = 0) case, see [12]. Furthermore, the chosen
cut-off frequency ωc for the low-pass filter (35)-(38) is ωc =
12 [rad/s].
Next, the performance of the observed-based detector is
evaluated for two different attacks, namely a time varying
attack and a constant attack. The time varying attack is
described by
δ(t) =
{
0 if t ≤ 15,
0.1 sin t otherwise,
(44)
whereas the constant attack is given by
δ(t) =
{
0 if t ≤ 15,
0.1 otherwise.
(45)
Figure 3 shows the numerical and theoretical residuals yf .
Clearly, in both cases, the measured residual corresponds to
the predicted residuals (39) and (41). The numerical results
have been obtained by using Simulink (MATLAB) and the
solver Runge-Kutta with fixed step size of 0.001.
On the other hand, for the case of noisy output, it is
assumed that the output contains zero-mean Gaussian noise
η with covariance Ση = 0.001. In this case, by using the
empirical procedure mentioned in Subsection IV-A, it has
been obtained that the threshold value of the detector (40)
is αf = 1.55. It can be shown that if the attacks (44) and
(45) are added to the noisy output, then the detector raises
an alarm, i.e., those attacks can be identified.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we’ve introduced two techniques to exploit
the a priori knowledge that the noise is a high frequency
disturbance to make the attack/anomaly detection task easier.
In the first case, we retrofit the conventional chi-squared
detector with a filter to reduce the covariance of the detector’s
distance measure statistic. In the second case, we adopted
a robust observer with a discontinuous term that reveals
the presence of an attack or anomaly in the system. As
fault and anomaly detection tools are poised to bridge to
industry, such practical techniques are compelling ways to
boost performance and constrain potential attackers even
further.
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